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CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINE. By Randy E. Barnett. t Boston,
Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pp. xxxix,
1309.
Reviewed by Kellye Y Testy*
First having read the book of myths,
and loaded the camera,
and checked the edge of the knife-blade,
I put on
the body-armor of black rubber
the absurd flippers
the grave and awkward mask.
I am having to do this
not like Cousteau with his
assiduous team
aboard the sun-flooded schooner
but here alone.
- from Diving Into The Wreck, by Adrienne Rich1
I. INTRODUCTION
Just over four years ago, while I prepared to begin my first year
of law teaching, one of many moments of panic struck. As I sat on the
floor of my judge's chambers, surrounded by stacks of complimentary
review copies of contracts casebooks, I was confounded: How was I to
decide what casebook to use for my year-long contracts course? The
casebook publishers had, of course, tried to make this seemingly
overwhelming decision easier by identifying the distinguished law
schools at which their books were being used. When I compared each
publisher's list, however, I found more differences than overlaps.
t Professor of Law, Boston University Law School.
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. With thanks to all of my
colleagues, who have created a climate that privileges teaching; to all of my students, from whom
I learn so much; and to Tracey A. Thompson, who is at once my most challenging critic and my
most loyal supporter.
1. ADRIENNE RICH, Diving Into the Wreck, in DIVING INTO THE WRECK 22, 22 (1973).
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Admittedly, the lack of uniformity at these distinguished schools came
as no surprise. Fresh out of law school, I expected those brilliant,
unpredictable, and fiercely independent professors to make their own
decisions after all. At my home institution, I was likewise awakened
to the fact that different professors used different books. Thus, the
idea of institutional solidarity provided no refuge either. To my
dismay, I realized that I was going to have to decide on my own what
book to use, with only the vaguest notion of the relevant criteria to
employ.
To make a long-and what to me was a gut-wrenching-story
short, I settled on what most would perceive to be a safe course. I
selected a casebook that is probably the most widely used in the
country, whose author also writes one of the most influential horn-
books, and which, more importantly, was currently being used by two
other contracts professors at my home institution: Farnsworth's Cases
and Materials on Contracts.' After three fairly pleasant and productive
years with Farnsworth, however, I abandoned his book (with little
fanfare and no gut-wrenching-but that's a story for another day)3 for
one of the newest entrants in the Contracts casebook market: Randy
Barnett's, Contracts, Cases and Doctrine.4 What could draw one from
such a sure and safe course? What tantalizing material lies beneath the
scarlet covers of Barnett's casebook? And, are there regrets and
dissatisfaction that haunt this flight from a safe, well-trodden path to
the new, crisp folds of a relative newcomer to the rough-and-tumble
world of contracts casebooks? In the discussion that follows (names
have not been changed; we are not innocents), I take on these questions
and, in so doing, explore some of the strengths of Barnett's first
edition, and suggest some improvements for the second.
2. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS, CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 1988).
3. See Geoffrey R. Watson, A Casebook for All Seasons?, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 277
(1997) (reviewing FARNSWORTH, supra note 2).
4. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINE (1995).
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II. A NOTE ON EVALUATIVE STANDPOINT
There are at least two obvious standpoints that come to mind
when one sets out to evaluate a casebook, standpoints that to some
degree mirror one of the oldest debates in contract law: objective
versus subjective.' One could attempt to adopt an "objective" stance,
looking to what the author says he intends to do (in the preface,
introduction, and teacher's manual), and evaluating whether he has
accomplished those goals. On this score, Barnett looks good, perhaps
because he wisely refrains from making too many claims as to what the
book accomplishes. The claims he does make-that he includes fewer,
but more lightly edited, cases than is the norm;6 that he favors "a mix
of classic and veiy recent cases involving provocative controversies,
memorable fact patterns, and public figures";7 that he jettisons"vexatious note material" in favor of study guide questions and
hornbook references;' and that he adheres to a "comprehensible and
intuitive five part structure reflecting the cause of action for breach of
contract"-seem to be largely borne out by the text. That being said,
however, I am tempted to ask what may be one of the most annoying
questions a first year student hears: So what?
Although a purportedly objective stance may make sense in a
standard book review, it rings particularly hollow when applied to a
casebook. A casebook is written for a specific instrumental purpose:
for professors to use when teaching courses by that, or a related, name.
To divorce the book from its use fails to capture this dynamic process.
Rather, it seems more useful to ask whether one can use the book to
effectively achieve the pedagogical goals one seeks to accomplish.
Granted, this more subjective evaluative standpoint somewhat
decenters the book from its position of power and redistributes it to the
professor and her teaching priorities and abilities, but in my view it
more accurately captures the questions worth asking.
This is not to say that the author's claims as to what he seeks to
accomplish are irrelevant. The author's claims may have been a
driving force in making the professor believe that the casebook is one
she can use as an effective tool in accomplishing her pedagogical goals.
5. See generally Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997 (1985) (revealing the objective versus subjective tension in contract law).
6. BARNETr, supra note 4, at xxx.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at xxxi. The five part structure reflecting the cause of action for breach of contract
is enforcement, mutual assent, enforceability, performance and breach, and defenses. Id.
1997]
Seattle University Law Review
In that respect the claims may have a vital, originating role in creating
the relationships that form the classroom community.1" Rather, the
author's claims are hollow in isolation. Not to put too fine a point on
it too early, but if, just for instance, Barnett were to write a casebook
to "prove" that a consent theory of contract "works," I may, nonethe-
less, use that very book as my primary tool in problematizing the
concept of consent. Thus, the author's goal in writing his casebook
may be accomplished by him in his classroom, or by another in her
classroom, but my class is unlikely to walk away believing in a unified
theory of consent in contract law.1"
That being said, I press on.
III. DIVING INTO THE WRECK 2
There is a ladder.
The ladder is always there
hanging innocently
close to the side of the schooner.
We know what it is for,
we who have used it.
Otherwise
it's a piece of maritime floss
some sundry equipment. 3
In discussing my choice of Barnett's casebook, I focus on two of
my central pedagogical goals, and describe how Barnett's casebook has
either helped or hindered my ability to accomplish those goals. Those
goals are to actively assist students in (1) learning basic (accepted)
contract doctrines and methods of analyzing contract issues; and (2)
developing a critical stance toward law in general, and contract law in
particular.
While the first goal is neither surprising nor complex, the second
requires a bit more explanation. By "critical stance," I refer to my
specific goal of assisting students in recognizing, understanding, and
challenging the ways in which a person's class, race, sexuality, and
10. By relationships, I refer to the relationship of the professor to the text, the students to
the text, the students to the professor, and the students to each other. The synergy created by
the mix of all of these is what I call the classroom community.
11. My standpoint is admittedly subjective. I am fully aware of the problematic notion of
the subject in these post-modem times. See generally FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda J.
Nicholson ed., 1990).
12. I have borrowed this heading from the title of Adrienne Rich's poem and book of the
same name. See RICH, supra note 1.
13. RICH, supra note 1, at 22.
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gender affect (and are affected by) the law, as well as my more general
goal of assisting students in learning to identify and to resist assertions
of power, claims of naturalness, and the seduction of simplicity. I have
found Barnett's casebook an excellent tool in accomplishing both of my
pedagogical goals, in particular the goal of critical thinking, although
perhaps not in the way Barnett might expect or like to hear.
A. Student- Centered and Learning Friendly
I want my students to learn basic contract doctrines and policies,
legal reasoning, and argumentative skills. One could argue persuasive-
ly that this goal could be accomplished with any of the major
casebooks on the market. While I agree that that is largely true, there
are many overt features about Barnett's casebook's structure and
content that are particularly student and learning friendly. And while
the book does not have an explicit focus on lawyering skills, much of
its structure and content create excellent springboards for encouraging
students to think like lawyers rather than like students, which
significantly enriches their understanding of basic contract doctrine.
Consistent with his claims, 4 Barnett manages to include many
cases that involve provocative controversies, public figures, and
memorable fact patterns. Such cases are fun to teach and certainly
pique student interest. Many students, most of whom come from
liberal arts backgrounds, often tell me that they expected to hate
contracts because they anticipated reading about boring business
situations. Starting the course with Baby M, 5 for instance, quickly
dispels that notion. Immediately, students are swept into a case with
which they may be somewhat familiar (increasing their confidence
level), about which they have strong feelings (generating easy discus-
sion so that students get practice speaking in class), and which is
usually well outside of the sphere most would define as the ordinary
business deal (encouraging students to ponder the appropriate scope of
private agreement making in society). Once the pattern of interest,
excitement, and care about contract law begins, it is infectious. And
because Barnett intersperses the alluring cases with more factually
routine, albeit doctrinally important ones, the enthusiasm for the
subject can be carried throughout the course-even after slogging
through such swamp lands as the lost volume seller doctrine or the
parol evidence rule.
14. See BARNETT, supra note 4, at xxx.
15. In re Baby "M," 525 A.2d 1128 (N.Y. 1987), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at
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While this enthusiasm toward the subject of contracts, which
Barnett's case selections spurs, is a salutory one for student learning,
it is not without its downsides. The worry here is that students will
be left with a misshapen impression of contract law, having studied a
disproportionate number of fascinating, but unusual, cases. Without
a doubt, any practicing lawyer will tell you that it is far more
important to be able to handle the run of the mill construction dispute
than it is to be able to appreciate all the subtleties of the Baby M case.
True enough. Still, casebooks cannot be all things for all people.16
Barnett's book is certainly less overtly focused on skills training than
some,17 a criticism that is unlikely to surprise him. In fact, Barnett
omits conditions from his coverage,18 even though using contractual
conditions in drafting agreements to control risk is an essential
lawyering skill. 9 That Barnett's casebook is not more overtly skills
focused does not concern me because there are many aspects of the
book that lend themselves well to an increased emphasis on contract
law in practice. Two key aspects, discussed below, are the casebook's
organizational structure and its inclusion of significant background
information on major cases and the judges who decided them.
Throughout his casebook, Barnett incorporates interesting
background material on a number of major cases which enables a
professor to discuss contract law in practice. For instance, Barnett
includes excerpts from Richard Danzig's excellent book on the
16. One of the reasons that I chose his book despite its lack of a skills focus is that I am
not particularly suited to teaching a course that prioritizes practice skills. Having done far more
teaching than practicing, skill development must be largely left for another teacher. That need
is met at Seattle University School of Law where we enjoy an excellent clinical program (including
live-client clinics and integrative clinics) which bridges the gap between students' substantive
courses and practice. In addition, many colleagues, including myself, often collaborate in the first
year courses on a problem that gives the students a chance to combine two or more courses in
analyzing the problem and to acquire some exposure to lawyering skills. For two years I worked
with a colleague on a joint contracts/civil procedure case; this year I am working with a local
attorney to give my class a practice problem that corresponds to each of the five major
components of my course.
17. See, e.g., ROBERT E. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATION (1987); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1987).
18. Barnett does, however, include cases such as Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E. 428 (N.Y.
1928), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 395. Although Petterson v. Pattberg is included in
the materials on acceptance, it does contain a discussion of conditions precedent that could be
used to spark a discussion of conditions.
19. For work that engages the use of conditions as an important risk allocation device, see
e.g., SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING CONTRACTS § 10.1-.8 (2d ed. 1993).
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capability problem in contract law2" as well as excerpts from law
review articles which examine the history of particular cases,21 or
address a broader topic that relates to the treatment of particular
cases.22 Barnett also includes biographical notes on the judges who
decided each of the casebook's principal cases. There are several uses
one can make out of Barnett's inclusion of this type of material, and I
find it one of the most distinguishing aspects of his book. Indeed, the
casebook's lack of explicit treatment of lawyering skills is ameliorated
by the background materials, which provide a sturdy springboard for
excursions into studying the lawyering process.
Barnett's inclusion of background material is a useful teaching tool
for three reasons. First, the background material enables the professor
to impress upon students that the appellate opinions that form the bulk
of their first-year diet are just the tip of the iceberg. That is, the story
that forms the basis of the litigation at issue is represented in a very
narrow form in the final appellate opinion in the case-which is usually
the one studied in law school. The background material helps students
to see the immense channeling of narrative that occurs in litigation.
Once this channeling is appreciated, students are well positioned to
critique the process that sweeps some facts away as the case makes its
way upstream. And when the kinds of facts that are swept aside, and
the kinds of facts that are maintained, begin to form channels of their
own from repetition, the potential for a more sophisticated critique of
law is presented.23 Likewise, Barnett's inclusion of biographical
information on the judges can be used to suggest that who the judge is
matters-a point that lawyers are keenly aware of in practice. Barnett
thus provides another bridge to practice, in addition to forming the
basis for a critical perspective of the law.
20. RICHARD A. DANZIG, THE CAPABILIrY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 120-25
(1978), excerpted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 1031.
21. See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, Quackery and Contract Law: The Case of the Carbolic Smoke
Ball, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 348-369 (1985), excerpted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 372
(discussing Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball, 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A. 1892)); A.W.B. Simpson, Contracts
for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 293-394
(1989), excerpted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 443 (discussing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng.
Rep. 375 (1864)). The inclusion of this material also gives students insight into the role of several
types of scholarship.
22. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992), excerpted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 187;
Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.L.
REv. 1065, 1115-119 (1985), excerpted in in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 140; Russell J.
Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WiSC. L. REv. 1, 26-29, excerpted in
BARNETT, supra note 4, at 839.
23. See infra Part IIB (discussing contract law's treatment of race, class, sexuality, gender).
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Second, the presentation of the obscured facts of a particular
litigation in the background materials allows students some initial
insight into the lawyering process. In seeing how lawyers have
emphasized some facts and de-emphasized others, students can start to
contemplate their own roles as fact sorters and developers. Not only
can the professor use this material to discuss the selection of facts as
a strategic matter, but she can also emphasize the ethics of selecting
certain facts over others. By this, I refer to the ethics of professional
responsibility, as well as to ethics in the larger sense of choices with
which one is personally comfortable. For instance, in a particular
dispute (perhaps a surrogacy battle like Baby M) it may be in the
client's best interest to bring into the light that the opposing party is
a lesbian or a gay man, given that the law is still often a site of
oppression for lesbians and gay men. To do so, however, may be a
troubling normative choice for a lawyer who is gay or lesbian or who
works to rid the legal system of this kind of oppression.24
Finally, Barnett's use of background material draws attention to
the human dimension of law which is often concealed in appellate
opinions that, more often than not, focus on abstract rules. The story
behind the case illuminates the people whose lives are touched by the
decision, revealing the human elements-often tragedy, loss, and
violence-that form the basis for so much of law's work.2" I believe
that this emphasis, once again, is an excellent springboard for
projecting students from their student role into their lawyer role. The
cases become part of the fabric of real persons' lives-not just
convenient props for the students' study of law.26 Accordingly, the
background material assists students in contemplating the power they
will hold as lawyers, as players in a social system that is often violative
of persons even when it is arguably working "for" them. With hope,
the "story" behind the cases will encourage students to reflect upon
their moral and professional responsibility to use that power wisely.
24. On the relationship between narrative, critical theories, and legal ethics, see generally
Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475 (1993) (part of a symposium on critical
theories and legal ethics).
25. See generally ROBERT COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS
OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) (exploring the violence of the law).
26. For instance, the inclusion of background material on Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641
(N.H. 1929), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 73 (the "hairy hand" case), reveals that even
though George Hawkins "won" in the opinion in the book, he did not fare very well in life, at
least in part because of the surgical operation that formed the basis for his complaint against Dr.
McGee. Barnett includes the related litigation between McGee and his insurance company in this
section as well, which provides students a window into an area of litigation where the real battles
are often fought and shows the interrelatedness of cases. See BARNETT, supra note 4, at 73-82.
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Just as Barnett's inclusion of background material assists students
in understanding basic contract doctrine and gaining facility with
lawyering skills, so too does the general organization and content of the
casebook. As noted earlier, Barnett's casebook is fairly traditional in
its doctrinal coverage, with all the basics (except conditions) present
and accounted for.27 In addition, Barnett includes a brief section on
agency, which is a subsection of multiparty transactions (along with
third-party beneficiary doctrine and assignment and delegation).2
Nice touch, and arguably necessary given my experience teaching
Payment Law, where students have little familiarity with agency
concepts.29
Having decided to treat the topic of agency, however, Barnett
might profitably integrate it into sections where it has some cross-over
effect. For instance, perhaps it would be better placed in the section
on offer and acceptance, given that contract formation is done largely
through agents (Bamett's stated reason for including the unit on agency
in the first place),30 or even placed in the section on foreseeability of
damages, given its substantial entanglement with those doctrinal
questions.31 Agency issues figure prominently not only in the classic
Hadley v. Baxendale32 case, but also in the more modern context
27. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
28. See BARNETT, supra note 4, at 589.
29. This may be attributable to the fact that agency is covered in some basic business
organizations courses, but not in others, and to the fact that many students do not take a separate
agency or agency and partnership class.
30. BARNETT, supra note 4, at 589.
31. Including agency materials within the foreseeabiity section would also serve to bolster
a rather weak part of Barnett's treatment of remedies. The only foreseeabiity materials are
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 97, and
Morrow v. First National Bank of Hot Springs, 550 S.W. 429 (Ark. 1977), reprinted in BARNETT,
supra note 4, at 111. Morrow is an unusual case that concerns a breach of contract claim by
Morrow, a coin collector, against the bank for the value of some coins that were stolen from his
home. His theory was that the bank had promised to notify him as soon as some new safety
deposit boxes were available, and that the bank's breach of that promise caused him loss. The
safety deposit boxes apparently became available on August 30, the bank did not notify Morrow,
and his house was burglarized on September 4. From a summary judgment in favor of the bank,
Morrow appealed and lost before the Arkansas Supreme Court. The court adopted the tacit
agreement test to hold the lower court on the ground that "the bank's bare promise to notify
[Morrow] as soon as the boxes were available did not amount to a tacit agreement that the bank
... would be liable for [Morrow's loss]." Id. at 113. While it is interesting to contrast the tacit
agreement test with the Hadley rule, the unusual facts of Morrow do not provide a fertile ground
for fully exploring the contours of the foreseeability requirement. This section could profit from
an additional, and more modern, case discussing foreseeability. See, e.g., Spang Industries v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 512 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1975); EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.,
673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
32. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 97.
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where contracting parties are dealing with large corporations (or where
both parties are corporations).
Other than the addition of agency and the omission of conditions,
Barnett's coverage of doctrinal issues in contract law is reasonably
standard fare.33 Nonetheless, there are a couple of high points for my
pedagogical purposes that require mention. More than most casebook
authors, Barnett includes several jumping off points for treating the
intersection of issues such as race, gender, sexuality, and class with
law.3 4 In addition, Barnett's doctrinal coverage and emphasis does a
particularly good job of presenting contract law largely as a set of
default rules that apply when parties do not otherwise bargain for a
specific term .3 ' By explicitly addressing the default character of many
contract rules, Barnett encourages students to peep into the lawyer's
role as a planner and drafter.36 The lawyer's ability to "contract
around" contract law (to a large degree) is second nature to one who
has thought about or worked with contracts extensively, but often
completely lost on first-year students who are so heavily invested in
learning rules that they miss the fact that the rule might be avoided.
This feature of Barnett's coverage helps ameliorate the nonpractice
focus of the book in that it gives students a feel for the lawyer's use of
contract as a risk allocation tool and a set of off-the-rack provisions for
use when the parties do not bargain terms out for themselves.
Barnett's coverage also presents the opportunity to again revisit the
question of the limits of private ordering as students consider whether
there are constraints on a party's ability to contract around contract
law.
While Barnett's coverage is fairly standard, his ordering of the
materials is less so? As noted above, Barnett portrays his casebook
33. But see infra Part IIB (discussing materials that provide springboard for discussion of
race, gender, sexuality, and class).
34. This feature is discussed more fully infra Part IIB.
35. Barnett has written extensively about default rules. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Rational
Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and
Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 783 (1992).
36. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 4, at 157 (contracting around the default rules of
damages); see also id. at 407 (filling gaps in assent).
37. There are many small ordering choices that I find particularly useful in assisting
students learning of basic contract doctrine. Barnett includes his discussion of the pre-existing
duty rule in the section on consideration, which makes sense doctrinally to me. Some texts, such
as FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, include it in the "policing the bargain" section, instead. Because
the pre-existing duty rule is, in my view, largely used to police the modification context, the latter
organization makes sense from a policy perspective. From a doctrinal perspective, however, the
placement in consideration makes learning easier. And once the rule is understood from a
doctrinal perspective, the jump to its policy basis is a fairly easy one. Barnett might profitably
[Vol. 20:319328
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organization as "a comprehensible and intuitive five-part structure
reflecting the cause of action for breach of contract: Enforcement,"
Mutual Assent, Enforceability, Performance and Breach, and Defens-
es."39 While there is much to be said for studying remedies before
studying theories of obligation and mutual assent,40 whether Barett's
approach is intuitive is perhaps questionable.41 At a minimum, the
remedies-first approach is certainly not linear,42 which makes it not
only difficult and controversial, but also the least student-friendly part
of Barnett's organization. Admittedly, it is probably the least student-
friendly part of my approach to teaching contracts, but I willingly
make the trade-off for the long-term pedagogical benefits I perceive it
include his material on illusory promises within the consideration materials as well, given that the
illusory promise is one of the few situations where consideration will be found lacking. Barnett
includes illusory promises within a chapter on interpretation, which is frankly not a bad choice
given that seemingly illusory promises are often found to contain more than meets the eye once
a court concludes an interpretative move or two (such as implying best or reasonable efforts or
implying a duty of good faith).
38. Enforcement is comprised of three chapters: Chapter One includes helpful introductory
material on studying contract law (more student-friendliness), a brief section on the nature and
history of contract, and a section on freedom of contract and public policy. Chapter Two includes
material on conventional money damages and their limits, and a section on liquidated damages,
punitive damages, and arbitration clauses (even more attention to alternative dispute resolution
and contract law would be beneficial). Chapter Three, entitled "Other Remedies and Causes of
Action," includes specific performance (containing extensive and interesting materials on contracts
for personal services), restitution, and tortious interference with contract. Chapter Three could
be significantly improved by including a discussion of other causes of action that blur the
contract/tort line such as fraud and misrepresentation. I defer the materials on restitution and
tortious interference until I have covered the basic theories of contractual obligation (and would
presumably defer other contract-related theories of obligation until that time as well were Barnett
to include more of them). Another suggestion would be to add to this section on "other causes
of action," but to move it to Part III on enforceability so that the students might more fully grasp
these as choices in their lawyer's arsenal of civil obligation weapons. If this were done, I would
suggest moving the material on implied and express warranties from the performance chapter to
the section on theories of obligation as well. This move would then provide a perhaps more
realistic view of the way lawyers think about litigating a case and provide a place to explicitly
problematize the idea that there are, or have to be, distinct boxes called "contracts," "torts," and"property."
39. BARNETT, supra note 4, at xxxi.
40. Once again, it is an orientation that allows focus on the lawyering process. When a
client comes in to discuss her case, she is often focused on the end she desires, the remedy. So,
too, does a lawyer keep that end in sight as she makes her way through the maze of litigation,
deciding what cause of action to assert, and whether its elements are satisfied. One may wander
endlessly in that maze without first having an idea of the end goal being sought.
41. Intuition, of course, is quite subjective. The remedies-first approach seems intuitive to
me in much the same way that a child who wants a ball and is learning to walk sees the ball and
then, in going after it, figures out how to get there, always with the ball in sight.
42. A linear approach would arguably place the issues of contract formation, enforceability,
and performance and breach prior to remedial issues.
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to hold.43 Apparently Barnett and I are simpatico on this cost-benefit
analysis, so I find no fault with this ordering decision. Barnett
includes a textual discussion of the reasons for adopting this approach
to ameliorate its potential disorienting effect." This candor with
students is a welcome reprieve from other texts which, through their
silence on the issue, can leave students with the impression that this
ordering is the only "right" one, or make students wonder if they are
the only one who finds the approach somewhat befuddling. In general,
Barnett's short textual introductions to each section are helpful road
maps for students to follow as they try to mesh one section with the
next.4 5
Another interesting organizational choice is Barnett's placement
of materials on freedom of contract and public policy at the beginning
of the book.46 This choice breaks Barnett's goal of holding to a five-
part structure reflecting the cause of action for breach of contract. The
rest of his materials on defenses to contractual enforcement appear at
the end of the book.47 If this move is any measure, then Barnett
should resist structure more often. There are many pedagogical
benefits to taking an early look at public policy limits on contracting,
an approach I employed prior to using Barnett's book.48  First, the
materials raise what ought to be a theme running throughout a course
on contracts: Are there limits to the concept of private ordering, and
if so, what are they? It is easy to lose sight of this basic, but central,
43. The merits of the remedies-first approach have been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., E.
Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406,
1436-37 (1987). I will not repeat those arguments here, but shall only note that on balance I have
found the arguments in favor of this approach more compelling than those against it. In addition,
emphasizing the law's felt consequences on person's lives is an important goal for my teaching.
Thus, an early look at what contractual enforcement means serves this goal of revealing law's
violence. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, in COVER, supra note 25, at 203.
44. BARNETT, supra note 4, at 71.
45. In addition to the pointed, helpful textual discussions throughout the casebook, in
Chapter One, Barnett provides a helpful textual discussion for students regarding the structure
of the book, the various dimensions of law (theory, doctrine, facts), and a suggested approach to
briefing cases. See BARNETT, supra note 4, at 3-9. I appreciate this material because it reduces
the number of items I feel compelled to address the first day of class and allows me to move on
to the substantive material more quickly.
46. See BARNETT, supra note 4, at 22-69.
47. See BARNETT, supra note 4, at 1061-1292 (chapters on capacity, misrepresentation,
duress, undue influence, unconscionability, mistake, impossibility and impracticability).
48. The casebook is accorded presumptive authoritative status by students. Students are
often skeptical of supplementary materials, and often do not treat them as seriously. This is
particularly true if the supplemental materials raise issues that can be characterized as
nontraditional. In addition, I gain credibility from having these materials in the text rather than
in a supplement. See infra text accompanying note 87.
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question as the course meanders its way through a host of doctrinal
quagmires.49
To begin with an examination of this question creates a touch-
stone for its frequent re-examination throughout the course. And
because Barnett has the other policing doctrines at the end of the
course, it allows one to come full circle. To look back at the initial
examination of this question as the course concludes provides students
with an opportunity to reflect on how much they now know and,
perhaps more importantly, how much remains to be understood. It
also provides a rather neat bit of closure (as well as evidence that one
might profitably begin learning contract law at any point on a circle
and be able to make his way 'round), which is likely important for
first-year law students who may be reeling slightly from classroom
discussions aimed at revealing the law's internal inconsistencies and
timeless conflicts.
While for me this tidiness is but a small branch I am willing to
hold out in a churning sea, I sense that it means more to Barnett.
Here, our intentions regarding the casebook may diverge most. 0 I
suspect that Barnett, a well-known proponent of a consent theory of
contract,S" finds this last section on policing doctrines further evidence
that his consent theory of contract works. The policing doctrines he
covers can be explained as necessary doctrines that ensure that the
consent given in a contractual exchange is the type of consent that the
law wants to enforce (invalidating, for instance, consent given under
duress, or as the product of misrepresentation or mistake). The section
on defenses can also be explained as evidence that the consent theory
that Barnett propounds will not have unduly harsh effects. 2 Just
look, after all, at all the doctrines we have that ensure that we enforce
only the right kinds of consent. How (too) safe, how (too) tidy, how
49. Most casebooks pay insufficient attention to the fact that private ordering is often
subject to public regulation. Contracts casebooks, by and large, present contract law as a wholly
private affair. This is troubling on many levels; I will mention two. First, many contractual
arrangements are subject to a host of public regulation, so it is deceptive. Consider corporations,
partnerships, attorney-dient relationships, marriage, domestic partnerships and adoptions. Second,
this emphasis on the private is primitive in a time when the public/private dichotomy has been
seriously called into question.
50. There is, of course, a vast amount of literature that engages the question of authorial
intention and the degree of primacy it ought to be accorded. See, e.g., UMBERTO ECO, THE
ROLE OF THE READER (1979).
51. See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986) [hereinafter Barnett, A Consent Theory]. See also BARNETT, supra note 4, at 652 n.45
(listing a bibliography of his writing on consent).
52. For evidence of this explanation, see Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 51, at 282
nn. 48-49.
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(too) grand! Needless to say, I think the ideology of consent needs
much more examination. While I find much that is appealing about
Barnett's consent theory,13 I am immensely skeptical of the notion
that one has discovered, or can discover, any one theory that fully
explains or should fully explain contract law. At this juncture, I
believe that a unified theory of contract law is unrealistic, and perhaps
harmful.54 Having an avowed consent theorist as the author of one's
casebook, 5 however, makes it significantly easier to problematize the
concept of consent and the ideology of freedom of contract. With the
consent theme everywhere in the casebook, and reified into its basic
structure, one does not have to stretch far to engage it. 6
This is the place.
And I am here, the mermaid whose dark hair
streams black, the merman in his armored body
We circle silently
about the wreck
we dive into the hold.
I am she: I am he57
Our philosophical differences aside, I believe that Barnett and I
share at least one key value--deep concern for student learning. Like
the helpful background material that Barnett provides, other features
53. For instance, as one who works in the area of law and sexuality, the idea of consent has
been a core concept in defining a line of demarcation against state interference. Furthermore, in
contract law specifically, the ideologies of consent and freedom of contract provide potentially
useful constructs for persons (such as gays and lesbians) who seek to insulate their lives from the
effects of laws that render those lives invisible or problematic. For instance, gays and lesbians
often use contracts to attempt to alter inheritance laws and other laws that do not respect their
familial status, or use relationship contracts as a substitute or alternative to marriage laws. See
generally Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian
Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511 (1990).
54. This statement, of course, calls out for substantial explanation that is beyond the scope
of this review. For now, see Kellye Y. Testy, An Unlikely Resurrection, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 219
(1995); and look for Kellye Y. Testy, Two or Three Things I Don't Understand (forthcoming 1997)
(manuscript on file with the author).
55. Barnett does make several disclaimers in the text about the appropriateness of that
forum for advocating a particular theory, see, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 4, at 652 ("A casebook
is probably not the place to advocate a particular and controversial solution ...."). And while
Barnett is an accomplished scholar, his materials also evidence one who is a dedicated teacher.
In addition to the student-centered orientation of the entire casebook, Barnett's teacher manual
reveals one who puts an enormous amount of thought and energy into teaching. I confess that
I have yet to be able to cover all that his teaching notes indicate he covers (although, of course,
I cover some issues he does not).
56. I am not the first, of course, to "teach against" a text. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy,
Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 591 (1982); James Boyle, Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1985).
57. RICH, supra note 1, at 24.
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of Barnett's book are student friendly, which greatly assists me in my
goal of assuring that students learn the basic doctrinal and theoretical
aspects of contract law. Indeed, there is enough that is interesting and
difficult about contract law that I feel no need to place more obstacles
in the way of my students learning the basic "black letter" doctrines.
My desire is that a book be user-friendly enough that students can do
the basic learning on their own, and then come to class to discuss the
more challenging aspects of doctrine, the more interesting clashes of
policy, and the more compelling critiques of accepted doctrinal tenants
and policy objectives."8 Barnett's format makes some strides in this
regard. For instance, the casebook includes "study guide" questions
before the principal cases that give students guidance in seeking to
pinpoint the important aspects of those cases. This is particularly
useful at the start of the first year when students are largely adrift in
separating the legally relevant from the legally irrelevant.5 9
Barnett provides study guide questions in lieu of the more
traditional "notes and questions" that usually follow a principal case or
end a section of a casebook. While most teachers know that many
interesting and challenging questions can be raised in a notes and
questions format, students often find that approach overwhelming and
irritating. Indeed, most professors find the questions posed rather
irritating given that they are often seemingly unanswerable even from
the professor's viewpoint, and the teacher's guide rarely provides any
guidance. While the study guide questions in Barnett's casebook could
arguably benefit from some expansion (some border on cryptic),6" the
approach is a sound one. Students will often give much more
thoughtful answers, thereby enriching class discussion, if they have had
an opportunity to reflect on a question rather than having it sprung
upon them in class.
A final user-friendly learning tool that Barnett's casebook includes
is excerpted provisions from the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which he reprints at the end of a
section that engages those provisions. While it is certainly convenient
to have the text of the UCC or Restatement in the textbook, for ease
of reference, there are some drawbacks to this helpful gesture. First,
58. Barnett's convenient hornbook references at the end of each section also helps students'
class preparation and digestion of basic doctrine.
59. One can certainly critique the law's sorting process in this regard. See supra text
accompanying note 23.
60. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 4, at 334 ("is there a difference between Judge Hand's
and Justice Traynor's theories of promissory estoppel that accounts for the different outcomes of
these two cases? Or do they differ about something else?")
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and perhaps most serious, is that the code provisions are out of
context. That is, one of the key features of the UCC is that it is a
code-it was written as a integrated unit (at least each article arguably
was, and each is integrated with the general provisions of Article 1).
Rather than giving students much experience parsing through a code,
however, Barnett's reprinting tends to leave students mystified about
where the code provisions came from and how they relate to other
provisions. This can, of course, be remedied by requiring students to
purchase a supplement that contains a full version of the UCC (or at
least a fuller version, perhaps most of Articles 1 and 2). In a cost-
conscious student body, however, that is certainly not a popular move
when many of the provisions that will be studied are printed in the
text, albeit in a jumbled order.
My own pet peeves aside, I have found Barnett's casebook to be
an even better tool than I expected for my goal of assisting students in
learning contract doctrine. It is student friendly in a number of
respects, which propels student learning outside of class with a
resultant enrichment of class discussions, and it is also a sturdy vehicle
for enriching those discussions by propelling students into the lawyer's
role that they will soon occupy.
B. Critical Perspectives
I go down.
Rung after rung and still
the oxygen immerses me
the blue light
the clear atoms
of our human air.
I go down.
My flippers cripple me,
I crawl like an insect down the ladder
and there is no one
to tell me when the ocean
will begin.6
In addition to my basic goal of helping students learn the basic
and accepted tenets of contract law, I also seek to develop and nurture
a critical perspective toward law in general and toward contract law in
particular. I confess that often times these goals seem to conflict,
especially when my critical reflex surges forth before the class has
61. RICH, supra note 1, at 22.
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absorbed the basic doctrine. This is, of course, part of the trauma of
the first year-the attempt to learn the law while everyone about you
is poking holes in it. For one like me, who occasionally does find these
two goals in tension, a fairly traditional and comprehensible casebook
is a comfort. And as discussed above, Barnett's book is on solid
ground in this respect. Surprisingly, however, Barnett's casebook has
also turned out to be quite a gem for my goal of developing students'
critical perspectives. In this regard, however, Barnett's casebook
sometimes serves more as a source of friction than as a source of
comfort.
One of the components of my goal of engendering students'
critical perspectives is to assist students in recognizing, understanding,
and challenging the many ways in which law addresses (or fails to
address) issues of class, race, sexuality, and gender. I privilege this
goal because of my belief that law is, should be, and always will be,
entangled in social and moral reasoning.
Barnett's materials include little in the way of critical theories of
law. There is no explicit treatment of any of the many critical
perspectives on traditional contract law except for a brief excerpt from
Mary Joe Frug's feminist analysis of a contracts casebook.62 Really,
the only theorist who gets to speak in his or her own voice in the
casebook is Barnett himself.63 Barnett notes in his preface that those
professors who desire to emphasize more theoretical perspectives can
assign his supplement, Perspectives on Contract Law (Perspectives),64
in addition to the text. While Perspectives does include several helpful
law and economics pieces,6 thus bolstering the casebook's lack of
62. Mary Joe Frug, ReReading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34
AM. U.L. REV. 1065, 1115-19 (1985), excerpted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 140. While I am
pleased that Barnett includes some of Frug's work, this excerpt (devoted to the Shirley McClaine
case) is so short as to be rather misleading about the scope of her article. It is also not the
strongest part of the article, which may set up an easy critique of her work. Moreover, because
Frug's article is widely cited, I worry that it may be too easy to include a short excerpt from it
and "check off that box."
63. See BARNETT, supra note 4, at 631-54. Here Barnett provides a textual discussion of
the six core principles of enforceability (will, reliance, restitution, efficiency, fairness, and bargain)
and then "integrates" them with his consent theory. Id. at 651-54. To be fair, Barnett does note
that his "organizational scheme is not the only way to divide up the world. Others have been
presented by Moris Cohen and by John Calamari and Joseph Perillo." Id. at 632 (footnotes
omitted).
64. RANDY E. BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW (1995) [hereinafter
BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES]. Interestingly, the supplement is dedicated to Lon Fuller. For
Fuller's influence on another casebook, see Sidney DeLong, An Agnostic's Bible, 20 SEATTLE
UNIV. L. REV. 295 (1997).
65. See, e.g., BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 64, at 38, 50 (excerpts from RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 117-120 (4th ed. 1992); Id. at 42 (excerpt from
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material on that perspective, it adds only a short excerpt by Patricia
Williams in the way of critical theory.66
Although Barnett's casebook lacks materials on critical theory, it
surpasses most casebooks with its fodder on issues of race, class,
sexuality and gender. Although I long for the day when casebooks
routinely treat these issues directly,67 Barnett's book provides several
springboards one can use to dive into these turbulent waters.6" For
instance, if one is so inclined, the public policy materials (Baby M69
and Johnson v. Calvert7 ) are excellent vehicles to discuss all of these
issues. On the one hand, it is a blessing that these materials appear
first in the casebook, because it gives the professor a chance early on
to establish a pattern of discussing issues of race, gender, class and
sexuality. On the other hand, the early placement makes it difficult to
tackle all of these thorny issues because the students are still struggling
with basic tasks like briefing cases, and have yet to gain confidence and
trust in themselves, the professor, and each other. Students can also
get suspicious that they are not learning "the law" and may yearn for
more rules and doctrine, particularly if students in other sections have
started out with a rule-bound subject like offer and acceptance. Those
in class who are uncomfortable talking about gender, race, class, or
sexuality may get hostile and peg the professor as a "liberal" who is
not going to teach them what they really need to know about contract
law. Barnett's organization helps ameliorate this concern somewhat
because students are thrown into remedies immediately after a short
look at public policy-which certainly feels like law to the students
who were worried.
Daniel Friedman, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 1-8 (1989)); Id. at 52 (excerpt
from Alan Schwartz, The Casefor Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 275-279, 285-287, 296-
298 (1979)); Id. at 289 (excerpt from Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical
Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293-306 (1973)); Id. at 332 (excerpt from Anthony T.
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 2-18,
32 (1978)).
66. See BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 64, at 215-17 (excerpting PatriciaJ. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
401, 406-08 (1987)).
67. For a recent entrant to this market niche, see AMY KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING
LAW (1996).
68. I acknowledge that discussing these issues can be difficult, even risky. Still, I believe
it is necessary and desirable to do so. My confidence in this regard has been bolstered by many
conversations with my students who prefer the explicit treatment of these issues over keeping
them silenced.
69. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. 1987) reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 1120.
70. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 55.
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Likewise, the extensive materials that Barnett presents on
contracts for personal services, which include cases such as Lumley v.
Wagner,71 Duff v. Russell,72 Dallas Cowboys v. Harris,3 The Case
of Mary Clark, A Woman of Colour," Bailey v. Alabama,75 and
Lochner v. New York,76 lend themselves well to a discussion of race,
class and gender. With some exceptions," women appear in many
of the expected places in Barnett's casebook, making frequent
appearances in the cases Barnett chooses for the materials on duress,78
misrepresentation, 79 capacity,80 unconscionability,81 and promissory
estoppel.82 This is in addition to standby characters such as Shirley
McClaine8 3 and Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 4 whose portrayals of
71. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Chancery Div. 1852), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 222.
72. 14 N.Y.S. 134 (N.Y. 1891), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 229.
73. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. 1961), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 241.
74. 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 218. The concern
with this case, however, is that it gives a misleading vision of the courts' treatment of race
because the court discharges a woman of colour from her contract of indenture. Some students
may be tempted to read this case as proof that the law was not and is now not racist. Still, I
prefer to have the material there to work with, engaging that worry explicitly in class discussion,
rather than having the material make issues such as racism appear to be nonexistent. The case
contains many statements that provoke excellent discussion. See, e.g., id. at 219 ("We shall,
therefore, discard all distinctions that might be drawn from the colour of the appellant.") These
statements provide an excellent vehicle for discussing the question of whether issues such as race,
class, gender and sexuality ought to "matter" in the law. See also, Bailey v. State of Alabama, 219
U.S. 219 (1911), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 247, 249 ("We at once dismiss from
consideration the fact that the plaintiff in error is a black man.").
75. 219 U.S. 219 (1911), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 247.
76. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 254.
77. See e.g., Mistletoe Express Service v. Lucke, 762 S.W.2d 637 (1988), reprinted in
BARNETT, supra note 4, at 128 (a female plaintiff is the owner of a freight company); Duff v.
Russell, 14 N.Y.S. 134 (1891), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 229.
78. See, e.g., Silsbee v. Webber, 50 N.E. 555 (Mass. 1898), reprinted in BARNETT, supra
note 4, at 1125.
79. See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968),
reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 1115; In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. 1987),
reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 1120.
80. See, e.g., Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Board of the City of New York, 250 N.E.2d
460 (N.Y. 1964), reprinted in BARNE'rr, supra note 4, at 1070; Brooke Shields v. Gross, 448
N.E.2d 108 (N.Y. 1983), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 1095.
81. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 1156.
82. See e.g., Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1959), reprinted in BARNETT,
supra note 4, at 823; Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 368 (Neb. 1898), reprinted in BARNETT, supra
note 4, at 806; Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862 (Tenn. 1982), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note
4, at 892.
83. Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970), reprinted in
BARNE'T, supra note 4, at 132.
84. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), reprinted in BARNETT,
supra note 4, at 429.
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women have been noted elsewhere."5 The only known homosexual
to make an appearance in the book is Donald Odorizzi, who is arguing
undue influence to attempt to rescind a contract of resignation he
entered into with his employer (a school board) when he was arrested
for homosexual activity.8 6 I explicitly focus on these issues, encourag-
ing students to confront this disproportional representation in
particular classes of cases. Left undiscussed, however, I worry that the
casebook could be used to foster, even subconsciously, stereotypical
attitudes about women, persons of color, and gay men and lesbians.
As noted earlier, however, I prefer having the springboards
Barnett provides (however unsettling they may be) to not having them
at all. Having the raw material in the casebook, on which students
center, provides me with some comfort, especially when the casebook
is a standard one-one you can easily assign without raising eyebrows.
Because so much primacy is given to the text used in a course, it is
often safer to at least ground a critique in the text, even though that
critique moves significantly past any critical issues the text raises. This
is particularly true for a professor who may be (or perceive herself to
be) at risk because of factors such as age, tenure status, gender,
sexuality, race, disability, or even an unconventional teaching approach.
First the air is blue and then
it is bluer and then green and then
black I am blacking out and yet
my mask is powerful
it pumps my blood with power
the sea is another story
the sea is not a question of power
I have to learn alone
to turn my body without force
in the deep element.
And now: it is easy to forget
what I came for
among so many who have always
lived here7
85. See Frug, supra note 62; see also MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM
87-95, 102-04, 189-94, 65-66, 176-77 (1992).
86. The charges against Odorizzi were later dismissed. See Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School
District, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 1146.
87. RICH, supra note 1, at 23.
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A second component of my goal of engendering students' critical
perspectives is the general desire to encourage students to resist power.
This resistance entails questioning what goes unquestioned (the"natural") and fighting the common urge to mask complexity.
Students begin law school with instincts for passivity,"8 often accept-
ing what courts do without critical assessment, leaving pronouncements
of professors unchallenged, and generally bowing to assertions of
power.
I seek more resistance.
I do not want to chum out students who are complacent and
overly trusting in the face of power. One common way to model this
resistance is to encourage students to question the rationale of courts,
an approach which usually takes hold fairly promptly and sticks if
properly nurtured. This technique, however, still leaves many
assertions of power uninterrogated.
The casebook itself can provide a useful site for interrogation.
Because students accord so much primacy to the text, the power of
inclusion and exclusion in the casebook demands reflection.89
Barnett's casebook helps me reach this goal because of what it is not.
Barnett's text does not explicitly confront the many unresolved
(unresolvable, I would argue) tensions in contract law. Contract law's
ambivalence is not confronted directly, perhaps because Barnett
believes it can be resolved (with his consent theory). Surfacing the
many tensions in contract law, without making an effort to necessarily"resolve" all of those tensions, provides an occasion for the professor
to resist the power of a casebook which encourages a unified vision of
contract law. This process also provides a tangible example of resisting
the seduction of simplicity, for it would, of course, be easier if these
tensions would only work their way into a neat and tidy theory. For
me, however, one of the alluring features of contract law is its constant
struggle to mediate frequently conflicting values. I seek to reveal these
tensions, not to mask them.
88. The source of this passivity is an interesting question. One could, of course look to
the structure of society, and the structure of law school for possible hints, but the subject is too
vast and disconcerting for treatment here.
89. Of course, a professor should also be critical of her own choices, for those are also
significant assertions of power (and can be more significant when the professor gives the casebook
author a secondary role in her course).
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I came to explore the wreck.
The words are purposes.
The words are maps.
I came to see the damage that was done
and the treasures that prevail.9
A further part of my efforts to encourage students to resist
assertions of power is to encourage students to dispel the "naturalness"
of a variety of contingent social forms. By that I mean the process by
which we attribute a natural quality to a particular form, then
experience our everyday lives through this constructed lens, which
reinforces the original perception of naturalness. The "naturalness" of
genetics as determinants of parenthood is an example of this process;
so is the "naturalness" of heterosexuality; so is the "naturalness" of
bargain and consent as determinants of contractual enforceability; and
so is the "naturalness" of race, sex and gender as meaningful categori-
zation concepts. Of course, there are others.
The ideology of "naturalness" is, indeed, a powerful one. To
dispel the acceptance of the concept of naturalness, I use the cases as
vehicles for exploring various visions of how the world is and how it
ought to be. Barnett provides plenty of material for this purpose,
particularly with his inclusion of the public policy materials,91 his
extensive treatment of the various theories of obligation, and his
inclusion of cases such as Marvin v. Marvin92 and Posner v. Posner93
which concern promises between persons in intimate relationships. My
use of these materials encourages students to see the potential of social
transformation through law. My hope is that in connecting law and
society in this way, students will care more about what they do because
of a critical self-awareness that their actions (and inactions) have real
consequences. Each argument they make (or fail to make), each case
they litigate (or fail to litigate), each step they take (or fail to take) as
lawyers either promotes or impedes that transformative process.
90. RIcH, supra note 1, at 23.
91. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
92. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 4, at 655.




Barnett may well have intended a different purpose for his book
than the purpose for which I use it. But that is a risk he accepted
when he consented to have Little Brown publish his casebook.
Overall, he has created an extraordinarily useful tool for teaching. I
hope that in revealing my use of that tool, I have not made him regret
his consent. Although there are indeed many things one might hope
to find in a casebook, what I hoped to find was a springboard-a place
from which to dive and explore the wreck. And when all is said and
done, Barnett's casebook does just that. It provides a surface that is
both sturdy enough and springy enough to dive into contract law and
explore its damage and its treasures. As such, Barnett's casebook is a
learning tool of the highest order. It allows me, and I believe my
students, to visit, to explore and to marvel at the many sites within
contract law that need to be investigated and interrogated.
We are, I am, you are
by cowardice or courage
the one who find our way
back to this scene
carrying a knife, a camera
a book of myths
in which
our names do not appear.94
94. RICH, supra note 1, at 24.
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